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The paper examines the interlinkages between population pressure and poverty, possible impacts on 
household welfare and land management, and the consequent pathways of development in a low 
potential rural economy. A dynamic non-separable bio-economic model, calibrated using data from 
the Ethiopian highlands, is used to trace key relationships between population pressure, poverty and 
soil fertility management in smallholder agriculture characterized by high levels of soil degradation. 
Farm households maximize their discounted utility over the planning horizon. Land, labor and credit 
markets are imperfect. Hence, production, consumption and investment decisions are jointly 
determined in each period. The level of soil degradation is endogenous and has feedback effects on 
the stock and quality of the resource base. This may in turn influence land management choices. 
Under high population pressure, land becomes dearer relative to labor. This is likely to induce 
conservation investments, especially when conservation technologies do not take land out of 
production. When markets are imperfect, poverty in vital assets (e.g., oxen and labor) limits the 
ability or the willingness to invest in conservation and may lead to a less sustainable pathway. 
Boserup-type responses are more likely when (privately) profitable technologies exist and market 
imperfections do not limit farm-households’ investment options.  
 
Key words: Bio-economic models, population pressure, poverty, land degradation, incentives 
for soil conservation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between population growth or pressure, poverty and environmental 
degradation has been a subject of debate and controversies over several years with an 
upswing in the debate over the last 30 years (Malthus 1798; Boserup 1965; Scherr and 
Templeton 1999). There are contradictory empirical studies in East Africa (Tiffen et al. 1994; 
Turner et al. 1993; Lele and Stone 1989; Cleaver and Schreiber 1994; Grepperud 1996). The 
Machakos study (Tiffen et al. 1994), which documents Boserupian adjustments offers hope 
that suitable policies may lift some of these subsistence-oriented economies out of poverty 
and also provide sufficient incentives for investment in conservation. 
The concern for sustainability of production systems in resource-poor regions and the 
need to quantify the impact of resource degradation on the future productivity of resources 
has necessitated an interdisciplinary modeling approach that interlinks biophysical and 
socio-economic factors. Policy analyses for sustainable soil and water management require 
functional integration of agro-ecological and socio-economic information. The bio-economic 
model developed here incorporates important variations in the biophysical system (land and 
  2soils) and market characteristics in a rural economy, integrated under the framework of farm-
household decision behavior. The choice of crops and livestock, and investments in soil and 
water conservation technologies is therefore jointly determined by the biophysical system, 
market characteristics and the scarcity of land, labor and other household resources. Factor 
market imperfections in the village economy lead to non-separability of production, 
investment and consumption decisions of farm households. The model is calibrated using 
household survey data from Andit Tid, central highlands of Ethiopia.  
Earlier studies on technology choice among smallholders in the Ethiopian highlands 
found that low or negative initial returns to conservation technologies might undermine 
households’ incentives to invest in soil and water conservation (Shiferaw and Holden 1998). 
There was some evidence indicating that population pressure and land scarcity may even 
encourage removal of conservation structures (that occupy productive lands) introduced in 
the past through program benefits like food-for-work programs. The objective of this paper 
is, therefore, to explore the interactions between population pressure, poverty and land 
management and the consequent development pathways using a multi-period non-separable 
household model in which changes in the soil quality have feedback effects on the future 
productivity of land. The paper is organized as follows. Part two offers a descriptive 
overview of the case study area. The basic structure of the bio-economic model is presented 
in part three. The simulation results are presented and discussed in part four. In the final part, 
we conclude by highlighting the major findings and policy implications. 
 
2. THE BIOPHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM  
         The  study  site  (Andit  Tid)  is located some 180 km North-East of Addis Ababa in 
Shewa region. The Soil Conservation Research Project (SCRP) opened a field station at the 
site in 1982 and gathered extensive biophysical data. The area has a bimodal rainfall pattern 
averaging 315.4 mm in Belg (Jan.-May), and 1056.8 mm in Meher (June-Dec.) seasons. Its 
topography lies between altitudes of 3000 and 3500 m.a.s.l., with over three quarters of the 
land area having a slope of more than 25%, which makes it highly vulnerable to erosion. The 
area represents one of the low potential cereal zones in the country facing a serious problem 
of soil degradation. A variety of crops like barley, wheat, faba beans, field peas, lentils and 
linseed are grown often without fertilizer use. 
There are strong crop-livestock interactions in the system. The common types of 
livestock in the area include cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses and chicken. Crop residues 
  3are typically used as animal fodder. Oxen provide traction power. Animal manure is used for 
enhancing soil fertility and for fuel. Land may be used for crops, grazing, or tree (mainly 
eucalyptus) production. High population pressure and scarcity of land seem to increase 
competition between crop and livestock production, especially for larger stock. Sale of the 
small stock complements both household consumption and crop production activities. 
        Andosols and Regosols are the most commonly found soils. Other soils of minor 
importance include Cambisols and Fluvisols. Andosols, relatively rich in organic matter, 
are often found at higher altitudes and are mainly used for barley grown during the short 
rains. Regosols are found at lower altitudes where frost is not a major problem. They are 
poorer in N but richer in P. The Regosols are the most important and intensively 
cultivated soils in the area. New land management practices were introduced through 
program benefits (food-for-work) in 1981 and 1982. With termination of program 
benefits, structures have been removed from 53% of the plots (Shiferaw and Holden 
1998). 
Farm-households posses use rights to land. Land has been distributed frequently to 
peasants, often on the basis of family size and land quality, although recent reform programs 
(1997) were not explicitly based on these criteria. Surveyed households were classified on 
the basis of their oxen ownership, a vital means of traction power for smallholders in much 
of highland Ethiopia. In 1994/95, 26.5%, 15.3%, and 56.5% of the smallholders in the study 
area owned 0, 1 and 2 oxen, respectively. Households without oxen (the poorest group) 
obtain a relatively larger share of their income from renting out land and off-farm 
employment. For simulation of the biophysical system and variations in land quality, we 
classified land into different soil depth and slope classes.  Land ‘ownership’ by soil type and 
soil depth classes is presented in Table 1.  
Due to its proximity to a major highway, Andit Tid has good access to relatively well-
developed output markets in the vicinity. But, there are significant transportation costs to 
some of the accessible markets in the area. Some labor, land, trees, and livestock and cash 
(or grains) credit may be obtained within the village. Major transactions often occur in one of 
the nearby small markets. Short-term informal land rental contracts (share or fixed rent 
tenancy) may also occur. The rental value of land depends on perceived quality of land, but 
conservation does not necessarily increase the rental value. Informal credit markets are 
generally under developed. Formal credit was also largely unavailable. There is seasonality 
in product prices indicating a high negative covariance between supply and prices. The labor 
  4market is largely inactive. The reservation wage may, however, vary seasonally. Labor may 
be hired in for cash, in fixed share of the crop output or in exchange for traction power. 
 
3. THE BIO-ECONOMIC MODEL 
Understanding farm households’ incentives and constraints to intensification of land 
use, technology choice and investment behavior, and analyses of the resulting pathways of 
development requires integration of biophysical and economic modeling approaches at the 
household level (Ruben et al. 1998). The bio-economic model developed here uses a non-
separable farm household model (de Janvry et al. 1991) as a basis; production, consumption 
and investment decisions are jointly determined in each period. The household’s choice is 
constrained by market imperfections emanating from seasonality of prices and transactions 
costs and asset endowments. The on-site costs of soil erosion and nutrient depletion are 
endogenous, and their impacts on land productivity in consecutive years influence the 
household’s choice of land management practices.  
 
The farm household maximizes the discounted utility (DU): 
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The utility function (Ut) has a constant elasticity of marginal utility of income (also called 
flexibility of money) equal to -µ. The utility function attains a negative value when income is 
less than subsistence, a zero value when income is just equal to subsistence, and a positive 
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FYt is the full income of the household. BNt is the subsistence level of full income, dependent 
on the number of consumers and cultural and religious norms, estimated based on previous 
studies in the study area.  
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Where PVt is the present value equivalent of the future value (FVt) the household is willing 
to accept instead of waiting for one more year. The upper and lower bounds of PVt are 
determined based on our household survey in the study area. The PVt is assumed to be 
dependent on the level of income per consumer unit in each period (CUt); the value of β is 
determined from an econometric model (Holden et al. 1998). The value of z is parametrized 
in the model to derive upper and lower bounds for the household’s rate of discount. 
Household’s full income is given by: 
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Acgt is the area of crop c produced on land type g in year t. Lvt is production of units of 
livestock v in each period. xt is a vector of inputs (x1t, …, xnt ) used in production of a unit of 
crop c in land type g and livestock v in year t.
 ρ is the per unit price of crops or livestock and 
e is the per unit input cost. Ycgt and Yvt are the yield functions for the production of crop c or 
livestock v, respectively. Family labor "consumed" as home time (leisure) in each season (s) 
is hst while wst is the seasonal reservation wage (after transactions costs). The seasonal off-
farm labor supply is olst.  
Crop yield is a non-linear function of the land type, the rooting depth in each period, 
the cumulative reduction in the plant available nutrient stock, level of fertilizer use and 
conservation technology choice. Hence, the yield of crop c in each land type (g) is given as: 
( k P N sd y t t t t cgt , ,  f , =  (4) 
 
Where sdt is the soil depth, kt is the type of conservation technology used, and Nt and Pt are 
nitrogen and phosphorus available to plants. The soil depth-yield relationship is 
econometrically estimated based on the SCRP time-series collected at the site, while 
responses to N and P are estimated from the FAO fertilizer response studies and the soil 
productivity calculator (Aune and Lal 1995).  
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of fertilizer and animal manure, nitrogen fixation and natural deposition) and negative 
processes (soil erosion, harvesting of grains and by-products, leaching, and gaseous losses). 
Soil erosion depletes both rooting depth and soil nutrients. The cumulative change in the 
available nutrient stock feeds back into the model to influence consecutive crop yields. An 
enrichment ratio of 2 is used for eroded soil. The change in the N stock is given by:   
( ) ( ) ( ) se se N N N t t t t t η η   − − − = + δ 1  (5) 
where se is the period t rate of soil erosion, δ is the share of soil nitrogen mineralized in each 
period and η is the N composition of the soil. An enrichment ratio of 2 is used for eroded soil 
together with an annual mineralization rate of 1% for soil nitrogen. The change in plant 
available N from period to period (&) due to nutrient depletion is computed as: 
( ) N N t t   1 + − = δ φ  (6) 
where  δ is as defined above. The reduction in plant available N is included into the 
production function (Equation 4) to influence crop yields in each period. Currently only the 
effect of depletion of rooting depth and N on crop yields are incorporated into the model. 
This is because incorporating the effect of P depletion on land productivity requires 
additional data on P-fixation, conversion of stabile P to labile P, and the total P-stock in the 
soils. The cumulative loss of N feeds back into the model to influence future crop yields. 
Based on the agronomist’s advice, the model assumes 1% of the soil nitrogen is mineralized 
every year.  
 The rate of soil erosion (set), and hence the change in soil depth for each land type, in 
each period depends on the soil type (st), the slope (sl), rainfall (rf), the conservation 
technology used (k) and the type of crop grown (c) in year t.  
set  = φ (stt, sl, rft, kt, ct)  (7) 
The parameters of this function were obtained from the SCRP experiments at the site or 
estimated based on plot-level survey data.  
The model uses graded soil-stone bunds (previously introduced into the area) as 
erosion-control methods. Construction of these structures is estimated to require 100-120 
working days per hectare (ha) while maintenance requires 15-20 days/ha/year, depending on 
the  gradient of the land. Removal of conservation practices previously installed on farmland 
is assumed to require 25% of the construction labor. Conservation structures may occupy 
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this was a strongly expressed concern of farmers in the study area, two versions of the model 
were solved; (a) the effect of area loss is negligible (Case I), (b) loss of land due to structures 
may reduce yields by 5-10% depending on the slope of the land (Case II). The first case may 
result if conservation (in addition to mitigating soil erosion) improves certain soil properties 
or raises relative returns to intensification (e.g., fertilizer use) and compensates the negative 
effect of area loss. The second case may result when such positive additional effects of 
conservation are negligible (or are offset by other negative effects such as increased pest 
incidence). Both are very likely scenarios. When initial yields with conservation are lower, a 
long time lag may be involved until conservation provides higher yields. 
   These two versions of the model (Cases I and II) are solved for the two household 
types: poor household (no ox), and less poor household (two oxen). The effect of population 
pressure is incorporated through changing the land-labor ratio of the household at the initial 
period. Hence, four scenarios are developed in each case: poor land-scarce, poor land-
abundant, less poor land-scare, and less poor land-abundant (See Table 2). The model is 
calibrated to fit the land and household characteristics of the study area in 1998. The model 
is solved for a planning horizon of 5 years with the endogenous discount factor.
2  
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1 Less poor households vs. population pressure 
According to Boserup (Boserup 1965) intensification of land use and investments to 
enhance its productivity will be limited when land is more abundant relative to labor. This 
suggests that smaller families with large farms will have lower incentives to increase 
intensity of labor and other inputs per unit of land to enhance productivity of land. Our 
simulations also indicate that when land is more abundant relative to labor, the land users 
lack sufficient incentives to make significant erosion control investments (see Tables 3 and 
4). The level of investment in soil fertility management is much larger for land-scarce 
households than for land-abundant households. The investment gap is even more pronounced 
if conservation technologies take some land out of production. For the less poor land-
abundant household, the cost of soil degradation in terms of future productivity decline is 
low. The limited effect of degradation on their welfare reduces the incentive to mitigate the 
externality, especially when the rental value of land does not increase with conservation 
investments. Shortage of labor relative to land also means that the labor-scarce household 
  8may have to hire in labor in order to install labor-intensive soil conservation investments. 
The cumulative effect of scarcity of labor and land abundance is lower soil conservation 
effort for the small household. When the area loss due to conservation is marginal (Case I), 
the land-abundant and labor-scarce households maintain (except those on deep soils or 
marginal lands converted to grazing) much of the initial conservation previously installed on 
their lands through program benefits. But, the land-scarce households, dismantle more of the 
initial conservation, but will still have more erosion control investments on their lands at the 
terminal period due to new investments made as household welfare improves through 
accumulation of wealth and reinvestments (Table 3). When conservation takes some land out 
of production (Case II), both households quickly dismantle the initial conservation, but the 
land-scarce households re-install them on lands where conservation benefits are large 
(shallow soils) (See Table 4). The reinvestment on lands with higher investment benefits is 
likely to increase if a longer planning horizon is assumed as conservation benefits accrue far 
into the future. Likewise, the effect of the change in the discount rate is likely to be more 
visible if a longer planning horizon is assumed. 
 
4.2 Poor households vs. population pressure 
When the household is poor in both oxen and land, population pressure (increased 
family size) puts high pressure on the household's ability to meet basic needs. While the lack 
of traction power forces the household to rent out land, the presence of high transaction costs 
and imperfect food markets together with the scarcity of land limit the household's ability to 
rent out land in cash and buy back its own consumption. Hence, the household rents in some 
traction power to grow some of its subsistence needs and rents out some of the land. But, 
meeting consumption needs of a large household becomes difficult unless the surplus labor 
finds employment off-farm. If the labor market is missing, the household is simply unable to 
meet its basic needs unless external assistance is made available. When sufficient off-farm 
employment is available, the incentive to implement improved land management practices 
depends on the profitability of farming relative to off-farm employment. When off-farm 
employment is limited (as in this case), the household invests surplus labor in soil 
conservation practices (see Table 5), especially in Case I. But, the level of conservation 
achieved is less than that of the less poor household (Table 3 and 4) mainly because some of 
the land is rented out annually without conservation. This is an effect of imperfections in the 
land market since the value of land does not increase with conservation investments. When 
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labor discourages conservation investments. The household will hire in some traction power 
and labor depending on the local market to produce part of its subsistence, but rents out the 
remaining land annually to others without conservation. Again, if the market value of land 
treated with conservation is higher and labor markets function well, the labor-scarce and 
poor household is likely to increase conservation investments.  
In Case I, poor and labor-scarce households maintain much of the initial conservation 
compared to the poor land-scarce households but the latter households generally invest more 
on new land management methods at the terminal period (Table 5). In Case II, both 
households remove all the initial conservation, but the land-scarce households re-install some 
of the conservation later when it becomes feasible to meet subsistence needs through storage 
of some food crops (Table 6). The labor-scarce households remove the initial conservation 
and fail to reinvest within the planning horizon assumed here since land is not the most 
limiting factor for their welfare. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
In resource-poor regions with high population pressure, sustainable use of land and 
other resources is becoming an important policy and development problem for farmers, 
researchers and policy makers. Policy-oriented research into the possible linkages and 
interactions between land scarcity and poverty and their effects on incentives for land 
management and household welfare is hence very useful. When the land-to-labor ratio is 
large, households are unlikely to carry out labor-intensive soil and water conservation 
investments. A growth in family size and scarcity of land increases the incentive to invest in 
land, especially when opportunities for off-farm employment are limited. Poverty, in labor 
and traction power, forces households to rent out land to other relatively better off 
households. Moreover, under the existing system usufruct rights to land in Ethiopia and the 
lack of recognition of short-term conservation benefits, the rental value of land does not 
seem to improve with conservation. Clearly, those renting in land under the informal short-
term contracts also lack the incentive to undertake significant land-improving investments as 
benefits accrue on relatively longer period of time. This is unlikely to change unless farmers’ 
rights are more secure and formal leasing out of land for a relatively longer period of time is 
made possible. 
  10The incentive to invest in conservation drastically decreases when the new 
technologies increase scarcity of land and decrease crop yields in the short-term (Case II). 
This scenario seems to explain extensive removal of conservation methods in the study area 
in the past. Households seemed to reinvest in soil and water conservation when the 
subsistence pressure decreases. But, re-investment is likely to be influenced by the 
magnitude of the immediate negative effect of conservation, like areas loss and pest 
incidence. We have assumed this initial yield loss to be 5-10% in this study. This indicates 
the need for additional incentives to compensate farmers for the losses they incur when they 
choose to invest in soil and water conservation practices. Recently, fertilizer prices have 
increased substantially with the removal of subsidies and the lifting of pan-territorial pricing 
system. Without sufficient conservation investments and for poor farmers who cannot afford 
higher input prices, this is likely to worsen nutrient depletion and degradation of productive 
lands. Under such conditions, our results seem to support targeted conservation subsidies. 
The external incentive is also justified when additional external (off-site) effects of soil 
erosion exist. In sum, the interaction between land scarcity and poverty and the incentives for 
resource conservation depend on economic and institutional constraints. Poverty, lack of 
profitable conservation technologies, and insecurity of tenure rights discourage adoption of 
more sustainable practices. However, population pressure and scarcity of land are more 





1 Lack of space prohibits presentation of model constraints. Only parts that link the household model 
to the biophysical system are briefly shown here. 
2 A 2.4% annual growth rate of the household is also included. Coupled with depletion of land 
productivity due to soil degradation, this increases the subsistence requirement overtime.  
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Table 1. Land area (in Timad) by farm household category, soil type, soil depth and slope classes. 
 
Soil type  Codes  Soil depth   Slope   Household category 
    class (cm)  Class (%)  No ox  One ox  Two+ oxen 
Andosols   All  All  2.03  2.82  4.02 
“ AD1S12  0-30    0-20  0.91  1.26  1.8 
“ AD2S12  30-60  0-20  0.57  0.78  1.12 
“ AD3S34  >60    0-20  0.32  0.44  0.63 
“ ADSS34  0-30    >20  0.24  0.33  0.48 
Regosols   All  All  3.52  4.88  6.98 
“ RD1S12  0-30    0-20  1.62  2.25  3.21 
“ RD2S12  30-60  0-20  0.86  1.19  1.69 
“ RD3S34  >60    0-20  0.31  0.44  0.62 
“ RDSS34  0-30    >20  0.73  1.01  1.44 





Table 2. Household sizes in the selected scenarios at the initial period. 
 
Less poor (pair of oxen)
2  Poor (zero ox)  Type 
Large
1  Small Large Small
1 
Family  Size  7.2  4.2 7.2 2.8 
Worker units   4.0  1.5  4.0  1.5 
Consumers  units  6.6  3.0 6.6 2.6 
1 These are average values from the study area.  
2 Traditionally, a pair of oxen is need for traction. 
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Table 3. Percentage of land area treated with conservation practices at the terminal period: Less 
poor households (2-oxen) when conservation does not take land out of production. 
 





RD1S12 RD2S12 RD3S12 RDSS34 AD1S12 AD2S12 AD3S12 ADSS34 
Land-abundant
1  4.521  32.4 26  25.8 22.2 2.6  17.9 0  0 
Land-scarce
1  2.076  78  97.6 93.5 97.2 0  96.4 57.1 0 
Land-abundant
2  2.68  32.4 26.0 25.8 22.2 2.6  17.9 0  0 
Land-scarce
2  1.208  78.1 97.6 93.5 95.9 0  96.4 57.1 0 
Land-abundant
3  2.68  100 100 100 100 1.3  100 0  0 
Land-scarce
3  1.208 70 57 100  100  0  100  80 0 
1 Lower discount rate (ranges: 0.25 to 0.26 for land-scarce, and 0.21 to 0.22 for labor-scarce households). 
2 Higher discount rate (ranges: 0.57 to 0.58 for land-scarce, and 0.50 to 0.51 for labor-scarce households). 




Table 4. Percentage of land area treated with conservation practices at the terminal period: 
Less poor households when conservation takes 5-10% land out of production. 
 





RD1S12 RD2S12 RD3S12 RDSS34 AD1S12 AD2S12 AD3S12 ADSS34 
Land-abundant
1  4.511 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Land-scarce
1  2.03 84.6  0 0 13.2  3.6  0 0 0 
Land-abundant
2  2.674 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Land-scarce
2  1.1857  64.5  0 0 13.1  0 0 0 0 
Land-abundant
3  2.674 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Land-scarce
3  1.1857  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Lower discount rate, 
2 Higher discount rate. The ranges for both the discount rates are similar to 
Table 3, but only slightly higher). 
3 Percentage of the initial conservation kept at the end of the 
terminal period (high discount rate).  
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Table 5. Percentage of land area treated with conservation practices at the terminal period: 
Poor households (zero ox) when conservation does not take land out of production. 
 
Regosols Andosols  Household 
Type 
Household 
welfare   RD1S12 RD2S12  RD3S12 RDSS34 AD1S12 AD2S12 AD3S12 ADSS34 
Land-abundant
1  3.371 22.2 37.7  13.7 0  35.2 28.7 13.7 0 
Land-scarce
1  -2.937 34.6 95.3  87.5 0  39.1 62.9 87.5 0 
Land-abundant
2  1.901 22.2 37.7  13.7 0  35.2 28.7 13.7 0 
Land-scarce
2  -1.921 22.2 95.3  87.5 0  39.1 65  87.5 0 
Land-abundant
3  1.901 74  100  100 0  100 100 100 0 
Land-scarce
3  -1.921  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Lower discount rate (ranges: 0.27 to 0.28 for land-scarce, and 0.22 to 0.25 for labor-scarce households). 
2 Higher discount rate (ranges: 0.60 to 0.61 for land-scarce, and 0.52 to 0.55 for labor-scarce households). 




Table 6. Percentage of land area treated with conservation practices at the terminal period: 
Poor households when conservation takes 5-10% land out of production. 
 
Regosols Andosols  Household 
Type 
Household 
welfare   RD1S12 RD2S12  RD3S12 RDSS34 AD1S12 AD2S12 AD3S12 ADSS34 
Land-abundant
1  3.364 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Land-scarce
1  -3.06  22.2  0  0 0 39.1  0 0 0 
Land-abundant
2 1.901  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Land-scarce
2  -1.99  22.2  0  0 0 39.1  0 0 0 
Land-abundant
3  1.901  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Land-scarce
3  -1.99  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Lower discount rate,  
2 Higher discount rate,  
The ranges for both the discount rates are similar to Table 5, but only slightly higher.  
3 Percentage of the initial conservation kept at the end of the terminal period.  
 
 
 